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ABSTrAcT
This article examines the relationship between radical change in an institutional 
context and organisational innovation. It is based on an exploratory case 
study of three Icelandic local governments conducted in autumn 2010 and 
summer 2011. While many crises, when scrutinised closely, appear to be more 
like threats of crisis, Iceland’s economic crisis is a genuine crisis with real and 
immediate effects. The three local governments studied responded to the 
crisis with actions that promote cooperation, reorganisation, acquiescence 
and involvement. The study demonstrates that most of these actions were 
reactive and somewhat non-innovative, though some were innovative – at 
least in this particular context.
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1 Introduction: Indigence is the mother of invention
If one really must be innovative, one will be – or so the adage goes. When under 
pressure, we seem to be able to find ingenious, original and uncomplicated 
solutions deep within ourselves. If this is true of people, it should also be 
true of organisations, since they are made up of people. Organisations facing 
severe challenges have good opportunities to unleash their creative and 
troubleshooting energies, so a reasonable assumption would be that crises 
catalyse innovation (Behn, 1980). Literature on organisational innovation 
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indicates that this may be the case, at least for some organisations and under 
certain conditions (see discussion in Schroeder, Van de Ven, Scudder & Polley, 
1989; Slappendel, 1996), and literature on change management finds that 
this is fairly common (Rombach & Solli, 2006).
Due to the crisis, government budgets have recently been severely cut in 
several European countries, notably Ireland, Iceland, Greece, Spain, Italy and 
Portugal. The long-term solvency of some of these countries is even in question. 
Other countries, both inside and outside the European Union, are scrutinising 
the effects of the economic crisis on the above countries, as the responses of 
their central governments are important for the world economy. However, 
economic crises of this magnitude affect not only central governments, but 
local ones as well. Local governments, located near the citizens, must handle 
individual tragedies such as unemployment, poverty and alienation, as well 
as the effects of institutional instability and distrust. If innovative action is 
needed anywhere, it is probably at this level. Interestingly, in an empirical 
study of three local governments in Sweden, Brorström (2012) found that 
the 2008/2009 crisis brought about actions identified as old solutions to old 
problems. However, Sweden’s crisis was not nearly of the same magnitude as 
Iceland’s. In fact, key actors in the local governments studied in Sweden did 
not even call the situation a crisis.
We seek examples of innovative local government actions in confronting the 
economic crisis. Our aim is to build knowledge of the relationship between 
radical change in the institutional context and organisational innovation; 
specifically, to build our knowledge of the organisational actions of local 
governments in response to the economic crisis.
Definitions of innovation from the literature refer to nearly anything 
concerning change. In this article, we define innovation (in administration) as 
a type of measure not previously encountered – at least not in response to the 
studied problem and organisational context (cf. Slappendel, 1996). Innovation 
– taken to refer to possible solutions to problems – has positive connotations 
as a prerequisite for making something different happen, for better or worse. 
An innovation is something that breaks from routine, tradition and formal and 
informal plans, causing an organisation to change course and head in a new 
direction.
Bureaucracy, the main structural principle of local governmental 
organisations, tends to dampen innovation (e.g., Mintzberg, 1979). However, 
local governments, like any organisations, are faced with a need to be 
innovative. This article is based on an exploratory case study conducted in 
November 2010, and a follow-up study from June 2011, of Icelandic local 
governments, which experienced a severe economic crisis in 2008. Iceland 
is an interesting case for research into institutional context and innovation. 
The entrepreneurial tradition is said to be strong in Iceland, and Icelanders’ 
self-perception includes a sense of »making things work«, often in novel 
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ways. Individualistic perspectives on innovation regard this kind of culture 
and self-perception as important determinants of creativity and therefore of 
innovation (Knight, 1967; Sarros, Cooper & Santora, 2008).
Iceland was chosen because of its context and history, and because its 
relatively small size facilitates study. The relationships between various 
sectors are close in Iceland, and the distances between people in different 
domains are not great. This closeness could enhance innovation, since it 
facilitates communication between the organisation and its context, for 
example, between local governments, state government and citizens (for 
a discussion of communication and innovation, see Saren, 1987). The local 
level is especially interesting, as it must handle demands from individuals and 
organisations while ensuring that local governmental organisation is robust.
2 Responding to institutional processes: Analytical framework
Crisis has no clear-cut definition. When a situation is labelled a crisis, someone 
is always defining it as such for a reason (Jönsson, 1982). Not least, new 
leaders tend to define the conditions prevailing during their takeover as 
constituting a crisis that necessitates changes (Rombach & Solli, 2006). This 
rhetoric, if successful, can spur personnel to make organisational reforms.
The crisis examined here has inspired various accounts. It has been described 
quantitatively (SIC, 2010), for example in terms of the amount of money lost 
(in November 2008, Iceland’s three big banks had to write down their assets 
by approximately 60%), the percentage of people who lost work (this figure 
increased by approximately 360% from August 2008 to February 2009), the 
number of people leaving Iceland (from net in-migration of 5,299 individuals in 
2007 to out-migration of 2,369 in 2009). It has also been described qualitatively, 
in many tragic individual stories. The crisis is well known in Iceland and the rest 
of Europe, and the experts discussing the crisis in the media are renowned 
and credible. An economic crisis of this magnitude, which radically changes 
the conditions of local government activity, puts pressure on organisations to 
respond: the crisis must be handled in some way, supposedly by changes and 
actions appropriate to the new situation.
2.1 Strategies and translation
Neo-institutional theories highlight conformity and adaptation to social 
norms and rituals more than effective processes. Public policies, laws, values 
and beliefs in an organisational field are institutional constituents exerting 
isomorphic pressures on the organisational configuration. Bringing the 
environment into the organisation often results in inconsistencies between 
activities and external rituals, and decoupling is one way to resolve these 
(Brunsson, 1985; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Oliver (1991, p. 147) developed 
a typology of organisational strategies for responding to institutional 
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pressures (conformity, acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, defiance and 
manipulation).
A later development in organisational studies was the »travel of ideas« 
metaphor, which moved theoretical development from a »diffusion« to 
a »translation« model in which institutional pressures, or rather external 
ideas, are translated, changed and localised in organisations (Callon, 1986; 
Czarniawska-Joerges & Joerges, 1996). We use Oliver’s typology and the 
translation model as analytical tools in this article.
2.2 Traditional organisational responses to crisis
Traditional cutback management literature is relatively homogeneous as 
regards the measures organisations should take when encountering crisis. 
While it is far from obvious that these measures necessarily succeed (Feldheim, 
2007; Levine, 1979; Levine, Rubin & Wolohojian, 1981; Nelson, 1998), they 
do indicate an ability to act and willingness to adapt. The literature presents 
various standard cutback measures, including:
• reducing staffing levels by attrition, hiring freezes, implementing RIF 
(reduction in workforce) plans, eliminating positions, early retirement, 
etc.;
• eliminating, reducing, and phasing out whole or parts of programmes;
• raising additional revenues from new sources;
• shifting responsibility for certain programmes to other agencies;
• deferring certain activities (e.g., building maintenance, renovations and 
studies);
• improving quality, efficiency and effectiveness (e.g., via process 
mapping and reengineering);
• using lower-cost labour (i.e., part-time workers, temporary workers and 
volunteers);
• using labour-saving approaches (i.e., increased use of technology and 
automation);
• providing incentives for resource conservation and performance 
improvement;
• reducing expenditures on selected budget items (e.g., travel and 
purchasing).
As mentioned above, crisis as a catalyst for innovation is the starting point 
of this article. If the Icelandic local governments had responded to the crisis 
using only the above measures, they could hardly be considered innovative, as 
these measures have all been used before. However, the way in which these 
measures were translated and communicated in the organisations could be 
innovative. The following sections present our methodology, followed by 
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three empirical cases and a discussion. In the last section, we discuss our 
conclusions.
3 Methodology
We base our analysis on data from three local governments, the central 
government and the Association of Local Authorities in Iceland. We selected 
the local governments using snowball sampling. First, we chose Reykjavik 
because, as Iceland’s largest local government, it could be expected to have 
taken many actions in response to the crisis. Then we chose Hafnarfjördur, 
which we learned was confronting major financial problems. Finally, we chose 
Borgarbyggd, which is well-known for major problems but, unlike the other 
two, has a relatively small population. The Association of Local Authorities 
and the central government body were selected because of their general 
knowledge of financial conditions and the information they could provide on 
specific local governments and their financial situations and actions.
Our research strategy has been pragmatic in that we have combined methods 
(Silverman, 1993) in order to understand and describe the institutional 
pressures on and responses of the studied local governments. It is also 
pragmatic in that it is neither purely inductive nor deductive, but follows a 
pattern of creative abduction (Schurz, 2008). Inspired by Strauss and Corbin 
(1990) and Charmaz (2006), our data processing involved iterative shifts 
between collecting, sorting, coding, categorising and probing the data 
and collecting new data, until we were able to reconstruct the relationship 
between the crisis and local government responses.
The data analysed were gathered on two field visits to Iceland in December 
2010 and July 2011. We gathered data using a field-note diary and 17 personal 
interviews (Kvale, 1996) with key actors in the selected organisations, 
summarised in Table 1. All the selected interviewees gave their informed 
consent to participate in the study.
Table 1: Interviewees
Organisations Interviewees, visit 1 Interviewees, visit 2
Reykjavik Director of AdministrationFinancial Manager Director of Administration
Hafnarfjördur MayorFinancial Manager Mayor (E-mail)
Borgarbyggd
Mayor
Project Leader in Infrastructure
Financial Manager
Mayor
Financial Manager
Central government 
(Department of Local 
Authorities)
Department Manager
Expert on Municipal Development Department Manager
Association of Local 
Authorities
Managing Director
President
Director of Development and 
International Affairs
Managing Director
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On the first visit, a query template of 12 general questions, covering financial 
developments over the last decade, organisational responses to financial 
stress and effects inside and outside the organisations, guided all interviews. 
These questions were followed up by more specific questions. All interviews 
were recorded and transcribed verbatim. On the second visit, a smaller sample 
of key actors was interviewed (except in Hafnarfjördur, where we followed up 
by e-mail). The questions in the second round of interviews referred more 
specifically to local government actions taken to handle the financial and 
social situation. Each interview was led by one or two researchers and lasted 
two to three hours. During and between the visits, the research group met 
frequently to discuss findings and queries.
4 Three Icelandic local governments and the crisis
In winter 2008–2009, Iceland experienced one of the worst financial crises 
in its history as a result of the worldwide financial crisis, excessive public 
expenditures and excessive private spending. In 1994, the financial sector was 
deregulated and Icelandic banks were privatised. A new era in Icelandic banking 
had begun, and the new financial entrepreneurs were young, aggressive and 
risk-taking. Stories of the Icelandic financial market and business climate as 
a whole emphasised rapid decision-making, high profits, unconventional 
behaviour, close relationships and great creativity. At the local government 
level, substantial resources were spent on large projects that made Iceland 
seem a progressive and modern state with fantastic opportunities for citizens 
and tourists alike.
The oversized banking sector (approximately ten times the Icelandic GNP), 
the banking sector’s risky investments and the small amount of Icelandic 
currency made the effects of the financial crisis especially large. In 2009, 
central government debt reached approximately EUR 150,000 per Icelander. 
This has had a major impact on the everyday life of every Icelander and has 
left the public sector struggling to satisfy citizen needs.
When the president of Iceland, Olafur Ragnar Grimson, declared Iceland 
bankrupt at the end of 2008, many strategies for handling the situation were 
devised. For example, the banks were put under state control, the banks’ risky 
foreign investments were sold and a great deal of public expenditure was 
radically cut back. At the local government level, some structural changes 
were made, such as local government amalgamations.
4.1 Reykjavik
In most countries, a city the size of Reykjavik, Iceland’s capital, would be 
considered small. Its population as of 1 January 2010 was 118,326, or 37% of 
the population of Iceland. Together with its surrounding local governments, 
the capital area has a population of 200,907, or 63% of the population of 
Iceland.
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The financial crisis that struck in October 2008 obviously affected Reykjavik. 
However, since a local government is by definition local, a huge devaluation 
of the local currency does not particularly affect it, as most of its transactions 
are conducted in the local currency. The main problem for the city was the 
rapid increase in unemployment, from 1% in 2007 to 9% in 2009, which 
meant higher costs and lower income for the city. The collapse of the building 
industry drastically reduced the expected revenue from the sale of building 
sites. Unfortunately, Reykjavik was investing intensely in an energy plant when 
the crisis struck. For this investment, the city had borrowed heavily in foreign 
currency; after devaluation, the cost of servicing this debt almost doubled in 
terms of the local currency.
The initial response was to unite all stakeholders. The city councillors set 
aside their differences to unite in crisis management activities, and an action 
group including members from both the majority and minority factions was 
established. This was done after years of conflict during which the city had 
seen, for example, four mayors in four years.
Budgeting for the time of crisis was based on three main principles: secured 
basic services for citizens, unchanged user fees and no layoffs of permanent 
city employees. Focusing on children and the elderly was a lesson learned 
from Finland. One of the first local government actions was to look closely 
at Finland, the Netherlands, Norway and other countries that had had to deal 
with major crises.
In the first round of cutbacks, the wages of most city officials and politicians 
were lowered. The mayor’s salary was cut by 15%, high officials’ salaries by 
10% and most other employees’ salaries by 5%. Those with the lowest earnings 
were not subject to pay cuts. New hiring was frozen, and a review board was 
created to oversee all new hiring in the administration. Total staffing of 8,000 
was reduced by approximately 500. International relations programmes were 
cut back.
City employees were motivated to offer ideas for cost savings through a 
special project: approximately 3,000 employees suggested 1,500 ideas, and 
approximately 300 of these were implemented immediately. These ideas 
included using energy-efficient instead of regular lighting, serving children 
porridge instead of cornflakes and letting the schools and kindergartens bake 
their own bread. According to our respondents, such cutbacks saved ISK 1.4 
billion (EUR 9.6 million) as of January 2009.
In 2010, it became clear that the potential of conventional cutback measures 
had been exhausted, and that the initial response had not been enough. The 
focus now shifted to organisational reforms. Several reform projects were 
defined, each with a board that included stakeholders and change or project 
managers. For example, projects sought to:
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• reduce school system overhead by merging schools, playschools and 
daytime childcare where possible;
• restructure school canteens and establish joint kitchens for school 
meals;
• assist smaller local governments with human resources, finances, etc.
In summer 2011, Reykjavik was still in financial crisis, with unemployment at 
8–9%; the ISK was still weak, and other European countries were falling into 
crisis, making the financial climate difficult. Reykjavik, however, was planning 
optimistically. Although unemployment was high, the 2009 forecast had 
foreseen worse conditions.
4.2 Hafnarfjördur
Iceland’s third largest town, Hafnarfjördur, has nearly 26,000 inhabitants 
and is situated in a bay just south of Reykjavik, between the capital and 
the international airport. Many of Hafnarfjördur’s inhabitants work in or do 
business with Reykjavik, and its proximity to the capital boosted Hafnarfjördur’s 
growth over the last decade. This potential for ongoing growth prompted the 
local government to invest heavily in projects to create new building land on 
the lava fields surrounding the town. These investments were paid for with 
foreign borrowing in euros, on the assumption that income from selling the 
land would cover the borrowing costs. However, the 2008 crisis made the land 
practically unsellable, and the local government even had to return deposits 
to some early buyers. All that is left of these projects is a network of streets, 
complete with streetlights, sewers and cables, but no houses.
Compared to many Icelandic local governments, Hafnarfjördur has an 
extensive public service, offering its inhabitants 15 kindergartens, eight 
primary schools, two secondary schools, various indoor sports facilities, 
harbour services, a library, music festivals, museums and – as the mayor put 
it – »everything a community needs to have.« Hafnarfjördur is proud of what 
it offers and people are still moving there.
The 2008 crisis led directly to decreased income and increased expenditures. 
The leaders of the three political parties represented on the city council 
discussed the situation, agreeing that the citizens and their welfare were 
most important. Together, they formulated three main lines of action. Firstly, 
cooperation between political parties would increase, given that the crisis 
was deemed more important than local politicking. Once or twice a week the 
three party leaders meet for three or four hours to discuss and analyse the 
progress made and to find new ways to continue making progress. Secondly, 
Hafnarfjördur is cooperating with other local governments to find solutions 
to their largely shared problems. Thirdly, Hafnarfjördur is trying to involve 
its inhabitants in the process, inviting them to open meetings at which the 
budget is discussed. All parties participate in this, even minority parties that 
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before would simply blame any problems on the majority party. As the mayor 
says, »Things are different now – we have to think differently.«
Organisationally, the crisis has prompted Hafnarfjördur to »cut the fat«, as 
the mayor puts it: to cut management overtime, freeze hiring and generally 
reduce spending, eliminating all nonessentials. »This is not enough,« explains 
the mayor, »now we will have to cut to the bone.« In practical terms, cutting 
»to the bone« translates into letting go of approximately 30 employees in the 
staff of 1,400, merging education and welfare units and closing the planning 
unit. The last cut was not difficult, since Hafnarfjördur already has whole 
neighbourhoods planned and ready for construction.
4.3 Borgarbyggd
Borgarnes, the largest town in Borgarbyggd municipality, has approximately 
2,000 inhabitants – over half the total population of the municipality. It 
is an important commercial town in western Iceland, and its economy is 
based primarily on commerce, farming and tourism. Since 1998, a tunnel 
under Hvalfjördur (»the whale fjord«) has facilitated travel to and from 
Reykjavik, making Borgarnes a popular place to live. Borgarbyggd represents 
the amalgamation of Borgarnes and several other local governments 
(Hraunhreppur, Alftaneshreppur and Borgarhreppur), making the local 
municipality relatively large in terms of both space and population.
From 1998 until the crisis in 2008, Borgarbyggd was developing well: the 
population was growing steadily by a few percent a year, the two universities 
(Bifröst University and the Agricultural University of Iceland) were attracting 
young people to the region and industry and tourism were growing. The local 
government’s economy was sound and stable. The situation changed radically 
in 2008, when Borgarbyggd began struggling with outmigration, empty 
housing, rising unemployment and industry closures.
By late 2008, Borgarbyggd’s economy was so poor that it had to report 
to a national government inspection authority. It also had to present an 
action plan, which was approved. This plan called for cutbacks in all service 
areas except social services, the need for which had increased. The local 
government found itself forced to sell all its shares in the local savings bank 
and thereby end an important relationship. Borgarbyggd also closed a day 
care centre and reduced the opening hours of those that remained. In the 
school sector, the town avoided a school closure (after major citizen protests), 
instead reorganising the school sector: now the elementary schools are 
organised into one school district instead of three, and education has been 
reorganised so that, for example, two classes can be taught together. Other 
cutbacks have resulted in reduced purchases of various products. The mayor 
says that services were increased in 2005 and 2006 – when smaller local 
governments were merged into a single larger one – to levels that now seem 
luxurious. It is not just the service level that has decreased. By cutting luxuries, 
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Borgarbyggd has reduced its permanent staff by ten (of a total of 280). 
Overtime has also been cut and more people now work part-time. Salaries 
have decreased by 12–15% for top managers and by a lower percentage 
for those with lower earnings. Employees no longer receive compensation 
for travelling in their own cars when going to meetings; instead, the local 
government owns three cars that can be borrowed and has also tried to 
minimise the number of meetings.
Almost all measures to handle the crisis were implemented by the local 
government administration, though other community actors have also been 
involved. Local government and the local business community have met on 
the initiative of the local government to discuss the hard times, but have not 
tried to organise any joint action.
Although the municipal economy is currently strained, there are some 
positive signs regarding the future. Not far from Borgarbyggd is a smelter 
that in recent years has employed almost 400 people, approximately 10% of 
whom live in Borgarbyggd. The mayor of Borgarbyggd says the smelter will 
attract other companies. Another positive development is the Landnamssetur 
(»The settlement centre« – a historical museum), which opened in 2006. It has 
received numerous awards and is attracting an increasing number of tourists.
5 Discussion
The actions taken in the three cases are summarised in Table 2. The local 
governments appear reactive rather than proactive and the key actors in our 
study seem to have fully mastered traditional cutback management (Feldheim, 
2007; Levine, 1979; Nelson, 1998): they reduce, sell, close, freeze and 
reorganise. They also cooperate with various stakeholders and try to involve 
them in creating ideas and plans. Table 2 shows that local governments have 
acquiesced to and complied with expectations regarding how organisations 
usually handle financial crisis. They have accepted the norms.
Table 2: Actions taken
Actions Reykjavik Hafnarfjördur Borgarbyggd
Cooperation and 
involvement - Between political parties
- Between political 
parties
- With other local 
governments
- With citizens
- With business 
community
Reorganisation 
- Review board
- Change boards
- School sector mergers
- Merging education 
and welfare
- Planning unit closed
- Reorganised school 
sector
Reduction
- Salary cuts
- Cut in international 
relations
- Employee cost-saving ideas
- No assistance to smaller 
local governments
- Reduced personnel 
costs
- Reduced spending
- Sold shares in bank
- Cutbacks in service 
areas
- Closed day care centre
- Reduction in purchases
- Reduced personnel 
costs
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Were the local governments in the study innovative in their crisis handling? 
Their actions were mainly non-innovative, but some elements of their actions, 
when examined closely, should be considered innovative. Firstly, some 
actions are new in the local contexts studied. The local governments emulate 
what other local governments in other countries have done via measures 
not previously implemented in the new context. The change in institutional 
context – the crisis – imposes pressures for isomorphism (the reproduction 
of similar organisational structures), isopraxism (the standardisation of 
organisational practices) and isonymism (the imitation of organisational 
labels or names) (Erlingsdóttir & Lindberg, 2005) that reflect organisations 
and organising practices in other countries, such as the Netherlands and 
the Scandinavian countries. While not innovative in a larger context, these 
changes are innovative in the local context. This search for useful ideas and 
experiences in other countries suggests that this is how the studied local 
governments manage to balance priorities and to bargain (Oliver, 1991, 
p. 147) with institutional stakeholders, such as creditors, central government 
inspection authorities and political opponents.
Secondly, the local governments may take actions that represent new 
responses to this kind of crisis. These actions seek to involve a broad range 
of actors and interests and entail a search for innovative solutions. One local 
government asked employees to come up with cost-saving measures, which 
led to a great number of useful ideas. Another local government sought 
to involve local residents, and yet another tried to involve and adapt to 
commercial and industrial conditions.
Crisis seems to be an opportunity to reorganise local government. The local 
governments in the study have reorganised vital parts of their services, and 
considered from a public opinion perspective this seems less onerous than 
shutting down schools and day care centres altogether. Politicians, employees 
and citizens protest less during a crisis, making change from a well-worn path 
to a new one more feasible.
Crisis represents an opportunity for some actors to facilitate change. It is an 
opportunity for new leaders – not politicians, but managers, administrators 
and controllers – to reshape their organisations into what they want 
them to be, and they often take advantage of this opportunity. These 
actors’ arguments and language are developed in the management field 
(Rombach & Zapata, 2010) and are well suited to turbulent situations. They 
take the opportunity to change what they want, possibly for reasons other 
than the crisis.
Our data indicate that two concepts merit discussion: cooperation and 
reorganisation. A crisis is a good opportunity to unify an organisation. 
In the local governments in the study, the crisis has led to less conflict, 
more collaboration and more joint action – antagonism is perceived as an 
inappropriate luxury in this situation. Various actors inside and outside 
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the local government organisation seem to feel that they have a responsibility 
to act. In Oliver’s (1991) terms, institutional pressure is being handled, not 
merely reactively and passively, but more actively. The key actors’ tactics 
involve concepts such as balancing, pacifying and bargaining, but also co-
opting and influencing, important stakeholders. Local government strategies 
range from highly reactive and traditional to highly active and even innovative.
6 Conclusions
Our conclusions are derived from a specific context of harsh economic 
circumstances in a specific country. The local governments in the study are not 
average Icelandic local governments, as their financial conditions are more 
strained than in most cases. These governments were strategically chosen to 
facilitate a study of innovative actions taken in response to stressful economic 
situations. At the time of writing, many countries in Europe and elsewhere are 
facing dire times, so the present results might be interesting from a broader 
perspective. We hope that studies of other local governments responding to 
crisis will follow.
During a crisis, a local government does not govern proactively, but mainly 
reactively. A local government does what its surroundings tell it to do 
– although possibly reluctantly. In the studied cases, creditors were the 
strongest external players: they wanted their money back and were largely 
unwilling to compromise. Others in the institutional field, such as the state, 
business community and voters, were also telling the local governments what 
to do. Local government somehow had to satisfy all demands simultaneously 
and, without sending conflicting messages, appear to function as normally as 
possible. During and after a crisis, measures are required in response to the 
crisis, external actors are constantly scrutinising the organisation’s statements 
and actions, and the slightest deviations are noted and immediately reported. 
Under these circumstances, it is not easy to be innovative: if an organisation 
is supposed to do as it is told, then it can hardly do anything but acquiesce. As 
seen in this article, however, some of the actions taken were innovative – at 
least in this context and as solutions to particular problems – in embracing 
political cooperation and citizen involvement. To conclude, our main finding 
is that, although many actions were taken to deal with the crisis, most of them 
were reactive and somewhat non-innovative.
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Povzetek
Kriza in organizacijsKa inovativnost: 
odzivi islandsKe loKalne uprave
Ključne besede:  inovacija, lokalna samouprava, Islandija, ekonomska kriza, 
pristajanje
Revščina je mati izuma
Če res moramo biti inovativni, tudi bomo – vsaj tako pravi pregovor. Ko 
smo pod pritiskom, smo globoko v sebi sposobni najti domiselne, izvirne in 
nezapletene rešitve. Če to velja za ljudi, bi moralo veljati tudi za organizacije, 
saj jih sestavljajo ljudje. Organizacije, ki se soočajo s težkimi izzivi, imajo dobro 
priložnost, da sprostijo svojo kreativno energijo in energijo za odpravljanje 
težav. Umestna je torej domneva, da bi krize morale sprožati inovacije. 
Literatura s področja organizacijske inovativnosti kaže, da je temu lahko 
tako, vsaj v nekaterih organizacijah in pod določenimi pogoji, in literatura o 
spremembah upravljanja ugotavlja, da je to precej pogosto.
Zaradi krize so v nekaterih evropskih državah močno oklestili proračune, 
zlasti na Irskem, Islandiji, v Grčiji, Španiji, Italiji in na Portugalskem, v državah, 
katerih dolgoročna plačilna sposobnost je sporna. Druge države, znotraj 
in izven Evropske unije, temeljito proučujejo vplive gospodarske krize v 
prej omenjenih državah, saj so odzivi njihovih vlad pomembni za svetovno 
gospodarstvo. Vendar pa gospodarske krize takšnega obsega ne vplivajo na 
državo samo na centralni ravni, temveč tudi na lokalni. Lokalne uprave, ki se 
nahajajo bliže državljanom, se morajo ukvarjati s problemi posameznikov, kot 
so nezaposlenost, revščina in odtujenost, kot tudi s posledicami institucionalne 
nestabilnosti in z nezaupanjem. Če so kje potrebna inovativna dejanja, potem 
je to verjetno na tej ravni. Zanimivo, Broström je v empirični študiji treh 
lokalnih uprav na Švedskem ugotovil, da je kriza v letih 2008/2009 pripeljala 
do ukrepov, prepoznanih kot stare rešitve za stare probleme. Vendar pa kriza 
na Švedskem ni bila niti približno tako razsežna kot na Islandiji. Pravzaprav je 
ključni akterji v proučevanih švedskih lokalnih upravah sploh niso imenovali 
kriza.
Iskali smo primere inovativnih dejanj lokalne uprave za soočanje z 
gospodarsko krizo. Naš cilj je bil ugotoviti odnos med korenito spremembo v 
institucionalnem okviru in organizacijsko inovativnostjo; konkretno, proučiti 
organizacijska dejanja lokalnih uprav kot odziv na gospodarsko krizo.
Islandija je bila izbrana za proučevanje zaradi njenega konteksta in zgodovine 
ter ker njena relativno majhna velikost lajša proučevanje. Na Islandiji so 
posamezni sektorji med seboj tesno povezani, razdalje med ljudmi na 
različnih področjih niso velike. Bližina bi lahko povečala inovativnost, saj lajša 
komuniciranje med organizacijo in njenim kontekstom, na primer, med lokalno 
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upravo, državo in državljani. Lokalna raven je še posebej zanimiva, saj se 
mora ukvarjati z zahtevami posameznikov in organizacij in hkrati zagotavljati 
stabilnost lokalne uprave.
Odzivi na institucionalne postopke: analitični okvir
Kriza nima jasne definicije. Ko je situacija označena kot kriza, jo vedno 
nekdo kot tako definira z razlogom. Ne nazadnje, novi voditelji radi trdijo, 
da pogoji, ki prevladujejo med njihovim prevzemom, povzročajo krizo, kar 
zahteva spremembe. Takšna retorika, če je uspešna, lahko spodbudi ljudi k 
organizacijskim reformam.
Krizo, ki jo obravnavamo tukaj, so opisovali različno. Opisovali so jo 
kvantitativno z vidika, na primer, vsote izgubljenega denarja (novembra 2008 
so tri velike islandske banke morale odpisati približno 60  % premoženja), 
odstotka ljudi, ki so izgubili zaposlitev (povečal se je za približno 360  % od 
avgusta 2008 do februarja 2009), števila ljudi, ki so zapustili Islandijo (od neto 
5299 posameznikov, ki so se priselili leta 2007, do 2369 posameznikov, ki so 
se odselili leta 2009). Opisovali so jo tudi kvalitativno, z mnogimi tragičnimi 
individualnimi zgodbami. Na Islandiji in v preostali Evropi je kriza dobro 
poznana in strokovnjaki, ki razpravljajo o krizi v medijih, so priznani in zaupanja 
vredni. Gospodarska kriza takšne razsežnosti, ki korenito spremeni pogoje 
aktivnosti lokalnih uprav, pritiska na organizacije, da se odzovejo; s krizo se 
je treba na neki način spoprijeti, torej s spremembami in dejanji, primernimi 
novim razmeram.
Neoinstitucionalne teorije poudarjajo pomen usklajenosti in prilagojenosti 
socialnim normam in običajem, bolj kot pomen uspešnosti procesov. Na 
organizacijsko obliko enako vplivajo javna politika, zakoni, vrednote in 
prepričanja v organizaciji. Oliver je razvil tipologijo organizacijskih strategij, 
ki se uporablja kot analitično orodje v tem članku, tj. usklajevanje, pristajanje, 
kompromis, izogibanje, kljubovanje in manipulacija kot odziv na institucionalne 
pritiske.
Metodologija
Naša analiza temelji na podatkih treh lokalnih uprav, centralne vlade in 
Združenja lokalnih oblasti na Islandiji. Naša raziskovalna strategija je bila 
pragmatična v tem, da smo združili metode z namenom, da bi razumeli in 
opisali institucionalne pritiske na lokalne uprave in njihove odzive. Pragmatična 
je tudi v tem, da ni ne izključno induktivna ne deduktivna, ampak sledi vzorcu 
kreativne abdukcije. Upoštevajoč ugotovitve Straussa in Corbina ter Charmaza 
je naše obdelovanje podatkov vključevalo večkratno ponavljanje zbiranja, 
urejanja, šifriranja, kategoriziranja in preverjanja podatkov ter zbiranja novih 
podatkov, dokler nam ni uspelo rekonstruirati odnosa med krizo in odzivom 
lokalnih uprav.
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Proučevane lokalne uprave niso povprečne islandske lokalne uprave, saj je 
njihov finančni položaj bolj kritičen kot pri večini. Bile so strateško izbrane, da 
bi olajšale proučevanje inovativnih dejanj kot odziva na krizne gospodarske 
razmere. Analizirani podatki so bili zbrani med dvema obiskoma Islandije, 
decembra 2010 in julija 2011.
Zaključki
V tem času se številne države v Evropi in svetu soočajo s težkimi časi, zato 
bi bili pričujoči rezultati lahko zanimivi iz širše perspektive. Upamo, da bodo 
sledile nove študije o odzivih lokalnih uprav na krizo.
V času krize lokalne uprave ne upravljajo proaktivno, ampak večinoma 
reaktivno. Lokalna uprava naredi, kar zahteva okolje – čeprav verjetno nerada. 
V preučevanih primerih so bili upniki najmočnejši zunanji akterji: nazaj so hoteli 
svoj denar in se niso bili pripravljeni veliko pogajati. Vendar so drugi akterji na 
institucionalnem področju, kot npr. država, poslovna skupnost in volivci, prav 
tako narekovali lokalni upravi, kako ukrepati. Lokalna uprava je morala nekako 
zadovoljiti vse zahteve in je morala hkrati delovati čim bolj normalno. Med 
krizo in po njej so potrebni ukrepi kot odziv na krizo, zunanji akterji neprestano 
pregledujejo izjave in dejanja organizacije in vsako najmanjše odstopanje se 
opazi ter nemudoma objavi. V takih pogojih ni lahko biti inovativen: če naj 
bi organizacija poslovala tako, kot od nje pričakujejo drugi, ji ne preostane 
veliko možnosti za inovacije. Kot pa je razvidno iz članka, je nekaj ukrepov 
bilo inovativnih – vsaj v kontekstu krize in kot rešitev za določene probleme – 
glede pristajanja na politično sodelovanje in vključenost državljanov. Taktika 
prepričevanja ključnih akterjev zahteva usklajevanje, pomirjanje in pogajanje, 
pa tudi izbiranje pomembnih deležnikov in vplivanje nanje.
Kriza je dobra priložnost za poenotenje zaposlenih v organizaciji. V pro-
učevanih lokalnih upravah je kriza povzročila manj konfliktov, omogočala 
več sodelovanja – antagonizem se v krizni situaciji dojema kot neprimerno 
razkošje. Zdi se, da se različni akterji, znotraj in izven organizacije lokalne 
uprave, zavedajo odgovornosti za ukrepanje. Naša glavna ugotovitev pa je, 
da je bila večina ukrepov reaktivnih in nekoliko neinovativnih, čeprav so bili 
sprejeti za spopadanje s krizo.
